Quarterly Report on Global Security Trends

2nd Quarter of 2023

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1. Executive Summary

This report is the result of survey and analysis by NTTDATA-CERT on quarterly global trends from its own perspective based on cybersecurity-related information collected in the period.

Featured topic, “Revisions related to cloud services in the government security common standards, FY2023 edition”

On July 4, 2023, revisions were made to the "Set of Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies," including the “Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies.”

Due to the revisions, the positioning of the Information system Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP) has become clearer, making it impossible to adopt cloud services not registered with ISMAP in the development of systems in the public sector. This is good news for domestic cloud vendors, and it is anticipated that the number of vendors aiming for ISMAP certification will increase in the future.

Featured topic, “Digital ID wallets”

A digital ID wallet is a mechanism where individuals present their personal attribute information (digital ID), validated by a trustworthy institution, using their own smartphones. Efforts to promote digital ID wallets are underway globally, including the EU's EU Digital Identity Wallet. However, there are significant differences from country to country regarding the objectives and progress of implementation. While digital ID wallets provide the convenience of verifying digital IDs online, there is also a potential risk of cyberattacks targeting these systems. Therefore, users need to exercise great caution in handling them.

Threat information, "Cyberattack incidents targeting Microsoft Teams users"

On August 2, 2023, Microsoft Corporation released a report regarding phishing attacks targeting users of Microsoft Teams. Introducing this attack and other Teams-related attack examples, this article will delve into the background of why this product is targeted.

It is speculated that attack campaigns targeting Teams, a popular business chat tool, and similarly popular services will continue and increase in the future. Anticipating incidents like those introduced in the main content occurring in the supply chain, it is essential to proactively consider response measures.

Threat information, "Escalation of cybercrime through generative AI chatbots and deepfakes"

This article will introduce cases of generative AI chatbots and deepfakes that cybercriminals exploit.

The emergence of generative AI chatbots has enabled even novice cyber attackers to create malware or phishing emails with little effort in a short time. As a result, the barrier to entry for engaging in cybercrime has been lowered.

The evolution of deepfake technology, with a significant reduction in learning costs, has made it possible to create sophisticated impersonations using images and videos on social media. To protect oneself from the threat of sophisticated deepfakes, it is essential to take measures such as verifying the caller and information through multiple means.

2. Featured topic, “Revisions related to cloud services in the government security common standards, FY2023 edition”

Kuniyasu Suzuki, Cyber Security Department

On July 4, 2023, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters made revisions to the "Set of Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies," including the “Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies” (hereinafter referred to as Government Common Standards). In this article, we will focus on the aspects related to cloud services among the newly added and updated content in the revision, examining their overview and implications across various domains.

The Government Common Standards serve as crucial guidelines for system development in the public sector. Those involved in the procurement, proposals, and design of public systems must stay informed on the developments in the standards. Moreover, the recent revision has brought about a clearer positioning of the Information System Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP). These developments may be of interest to domestic cloud service vendors and users, so we will explain them as well.

2.1. The Overview of Government Common Standards

The Government Common Standards are “a unified framework to maintain and enhance the information security standards of government agencies, independent administrative agencies, and similar entities based on the Basic Act on Cybersecurity,” [1] and a part of the “Set of Government Common Standards” as depicted in Fig. 2-1.



Fig. 2-1: Document structure of the Set of Government Common Standards [1]

To understand the overview of the Government Common Standards, let's first look at the composition of the Set of Common Standards. The Set of Common Standards consists of the following:

- Common Model
- Common Standards
- Guidelines for Creating Countermeasure Standards

The Government Common Standards are a document of common standards positioned between the Common Model and the Guidelines for Creating Countermeasure Standards. They specify compliance requirements for each item of information security measures. As a specific example, an excerpt of a description regarding email is provided below [2].

> Compliance Requirements
> (1) Measures when introducing e-mail services
> (a) Information system security officers shall set up the e-mail servers, ensuring no illegal email relaying occurs.
> (b) Information system security officers shall provide functions of user/entity authentication when sending and receiving e-mails between e-mail clients and servers.
> (c) Information system security officers shall implement measures to prevent e-mail spoofing.
> (d) Information security officers shall take measures to encrypt communications between e-mail servers in order to prevent the theft or manipulation of e-mails sent over the internet.

The above example from the Government Common Standards only illustrates technical requirements. However, the documentation also includes compliance requirements for management aspects, such as the framework for information security measures and external outsourcing, covering a wide range of domains.

2.2. Revisions in the FY2023 Edition

The document "Key Points of Revisions to the Set of Common Standards for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies" [1] provided by NISC lists the following five points of revision for the FY2023 edition.

1. Strengthening supply chain measures for information security.
2. Enhancing measures in response to the expanded use of cloud services.
3. Strengthening measures when using software.
4. Reinforcing cybersecurity resilience and enhancing measures based on threat and technological trends.
5. Strengthening organization-wide information security measures and ensuring measures according to the importance of information systems.

In this article, we will focus on the above "2. Enhancing measures in response to the expanded use of cloud services" and elaborate on it in 2.3. The overview of the other revision points will be provided in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1 Background and details of the FY2023 edition revisions (excluding cloud-related revisions)

	Background	Revisions
1. Strengthening supply chain measures for information security.	Incidents, including data breaches, occurred frequently at business outsourcing partners.	Added requirements that contracts include information security measures to be ensured by outsourcing partners, such as access control to information, logging and monitoring, etc.

3. Strengthening measures when using software.	The complexity and sophistication of cyberattacks targeting software have increased.	• Made it mandatory to implement measures based on IT procurement agreements [3] when procuring equipment, etc. • Added the start of operation of server equipment and terminals as the timing for vulnerability assessments, etc.
4. Reinforcing cybersecurity resilience and enhancing measures based on threat and technological trends.	• Proliferation of DDoS attacks • Expansion of ransomware damage	• Added measures for the defense and recovery of information systems, considering the possibility of cyberattacks. • Added specific measures against DDoS attacks. • Added descriptions assuming the implementation of Continuous Risk Scoring and Action (CRSA) security architecture.
5. Strengthening organization-wide information security measures and ensuring measures according to the importance of information systems.	—	• Mandated regular progress reporting on the improvement of information security measures to the CISO. • Added descriptions related to organizational arrangements for supporting independent administrative agencies within the jurisdiction. • Introduced the concept of the importance of information systems and requirements for additional measures based on their level of importance.

In Table 2-1, there is a revision under "4. Reinforcing cybersecurity resilience and enhancing measures based on threat and technological trends," involving the keywords "Continuous Risk Scoring and Action (CRSA) security architecture." This architecture is under consideration at the Digital Agency, taking inspiration from the US government's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) [4]. Simply put, it can be considered as a Japanese government version of a zero trust architecture. However, detailed explanations are omitted as it deviates from the topic of this article.

2.3. What does enhancing measures in response to the expanded use of cloud services mean?

In the document "Key Points of Revisions to the Set of Common Standards

for Cybersecurity Measures for Government Agencies and Related Agencies," [1] the background for enhancing measures in response to the expanded use of cloud services is explained as follows:

> The use of cloud services in government agencies and similar entities has expanded. Security reinforcement is necessary throughout the entire process, from procurement to development, operation, and disposal of cloud services. In addition, it is necessary to confirm measures (e.g., proper entity authentication and access control) for safe use of cloud services such as social media used for public relations, etc.

Based on this background, two major changes were made regarding cloud services [1].

1. In consideration of the expansion of ISMAP to independent administrative agencies and the commencement of ISMAP-LIU operations, **cloud services handling sensitive information must be selected from the ISMAP Cloud Service List.**
2. Even in cases where sensitive information is not handled, **measures, such as proper entity authentication and access control management, should be taken to safely utilize cloud services.** Additionally, when using cloud services that do not involve procurement activities, based on the "Guidelines for the Use of Social Media and Other External Services that Do Not Involve Procurement Activities," advice should be sought from NISC regarding the measures to be taken.

The first point involves changes to the fundamental measures regarding the criteria for selecting cloud services. In the FY2021 edition guidelines (hereinafter referred to as the "previous version"), the criteria for selecting external service providers in cloud service selection was stated as "to be formulated in accordance with the management standards of the **Information System Security Management and Assessment Program (ISMAP)**" [5]. In the FY2023 edition, this section has been modified as follows [6].

> The Chief Information Security Officer is required to establish criteria for selecting cloud services that are equivalent to the “Criteria and procedures for selecting subcontractors” specified in Compliance Requirement 4.1.1(1)(a)(ii) and are **selected from the ISMAP Cloud Service List or ISMAP-LIU Cloud Service List (hereinafter referred to as "ISMAP and Other Cloud Service List"**).

In simpler terms, the FY2023 edition changed the requirement from the previous version, which stated "select cloud services according to ISMAP management standards," to "select from the ISMAP Cloud Service List." This change reflects the fact that when the previous version was being considered, the ISMAP Cloud Service List had not yet been made public. As a result, the requirement could only be stated as "select according to ISMAP standards." The ISMAP Cloud Service List was first published in March 2021. In response to this publication, the FY2023 edition updated the description.

The second point is a revision regarding cases where sensitive information is not handled. In the previous version, the selection of cloud services to be used and the assessment of risk were basically left to the applicant for service use and the administrator who approves the use of the service. However, in the FY2023 edition, a new item called "Security Management for Usage" is introduced, specifying measures necessary for entity authentication, access control, information disclosure settings, etc. for cloud services. Instead of delegating the selection of cloud services to the field, the revision provides concrete security measures, helping to prevent the selection of cloud services with security issues and enhance safety.

2.4. Evolution of Government Common Standards, ISMAP, and Government Cloud

As mentioned in the previous section, the content related to ISMAP is a crucial point in the revision of the Government Common Standards in the FY2023 edition. Additionally, the Government Cloud, which serves as the government's common cloud service usage environment, has deep connections with the Government Common Standards and ISMAP. Therefore, starting from June 2018 when the Japanese government declared the "Cloud-by-Default Principle" as a basic policy, let's trace the history of the Government Common Standards, ISMAP, and Government Cloud using Fig. 2-2.



Fig. 2-2 Evolution of Government Common Standards, ISMAP, and Government Cloud

The description regarding the use of cloud services in the Government Common Standards began with the release of the FY2021 edition in July 2021. Meanwhile, ISMAP disclosed its fundamental framework in January 2020 and published the first edition of the Cloud Service List in March 2021. Following the publication of this list and the commencement of ISMAP-LIU operations in November 2021, the FY2023 edition of the Government Common Standards added the requirement for ISMAP in July 2023, as mentioned earlier.

The Government Cloud, on the other hand, has undergone a unique transition that cannot be accounted for just by its deep connections to the Government Common Standards and ISMAP. In February 2021, the "Utilization of Government Cloud by Local Governments (Draft)" defined the procurement of cloud services as "selection from the ISMAP list" [7] and introduced additional requirements [8]. These additional requirements cover basic matters and 21 fields, including conditions such as "at least 10 new services and 100 new features released in the past year," as well as detailed requirements related to AI. By establishing such requirements, entry into the Government Cloud was effectively limited to foreign mega-cloud providers. As a result, opinions on economic security perspectives and other issues were raised from various quarters and discussed, leading to articles in online and mass media. Subsequently, in June 2023, the Digital Agency practically revised the requirements through "Announcement of the Results of Market Research on Technical Requirements" [9]. As a result, in November 2023, Sakura Internet Inc. was adopted as the first domestic cloud vendor for the Government Cloud.

2.5. Impact of the Recent Revision on Various Fronts

2.5.1. Impact on the Government Cloud

The recent revision has essentially no impact on the Government Cloud. As mentioned earlier, the Government Cloud already requires "selecting cloud services from the ISMAP list." Therefore, with the recent revision of the Government Common Standards, both have achieved the same level of requirement for ISMAP.

In the "Announcement of the Results of Market Research on Technical Requirements" in June 2023 [9], the term "Sovereign Cloud" was also included. "Sovereign" refers to a person who has sovereignty or a ruler, and "Sovereign Cloud" is a term that means a “cloud in which sovereignty can be controlled from the standpoint of economic security.” If you are interested, please refer to our DATA INSIGHT [10] for more details. In addition to these trends, the ISMAP requirement in the Government Common Standards is anticipated to have a positive impact on domestic cloud vendors, although the impact is merely a “slight tailwind.”

2.5.2. Impact on Public Systems

The ISMAP requirement was originally planned, and it does not have a significant impact on public systems other than the Government Cloud. If anything, since there is no longer any ambiguity in the handling of ISMAP, there is no need for unnecessary considerations when creating procurement specifications and other documents.

When the ISMAP system started, a provisional measure was in place that "would allow the use of services expected to apply for registration within the next one year." This allowed the use of services not registered in the ISMAP list in the development of public-sector systems. This provisional measure was generally terminated at the end of September 2021 [11], and with the recent revision, the Government Common Standards can be said to have reached their final form.

2.5.3. Impact on ISMAP

With this revision, the attention to and importance of ISMAP in the area of public

systems are heightened. Therefore, there is an increased demand to maintain the reliability of the ISMAP evaluation system more than ever.

While the evaluation system objectively assesses if security management meets certain criteria, there is generally no guarantee that a certified service, under any security evaluation system, will be free of security incidents. Unfortunately, for various reasons, security incidents may occur after certification. This applies to ISMAP as well; in December 2022, a registered service experienced a security incident, leading to a subsequent re-audit of the service. To maintain the reliability of ISMAP, ISMAP-certified cloud vendors must take security measures, and those responsible for ISMAP certification must continue their efforts to review the certification criteria to prevent repeated security incidents in registered services.

2.5.4. Impact on Cloud Vendors

For vendors already registered, having invested a considerable cost to register with ISMAP, they aspire to have public systems adopt their cloud services. With this revision, public systems handling sensitive information must select cloud services from the ISMAP Cloud Service List. ISMAP-registered cloud vendors are likely to see an increase in opportunities for their cloud services to be adopted. As of December 11, 2023, the number of ISMAP-registered services is 49, and it is anticipated that the number of vendors aiming for certification will further rise following this revision.

2.6. Conclusion

Regarding the revisions related to cloud services in the government security common standards, FY2023 edition, the summary and conclusion of this article are as follows:

- Details of the revision in the FY2023 edition regarding cloud services are as planned.
- ISMAP became mandatory in the Government Common Standards.
- Adopting cloud services not registered with ISMAP in the development of public sector systems has become impossible.
- This is good news for domestic cloud vendors and may provide them a slight tailwind in the development of public sector systems.

This revision affects both the clients and contractors involved in the development of public sector systems. We hope this article will contribute to a better understanding and help ensure that the process of selecting cloud services is appropriate and smooth.

3. Featured topic, “Digital ID wallets”

Takeshi Shirakawa, Cyber Security Department

3.1. What Is a Digital ID Wallet?

3.1.1. Overview

In today's rapidly advancing digital society, users frequently present their digitized attribute information (digital ID), such as their name, address, and email address, to services to prove their identity. For instance, when obtaining a copy of the residence certificate at a convenience store, we use our My Number card to prove our identity or when opening an account online, we present our photo data along with our driver's license data to prove that the application is being made by the person documented in the identification document. These examples involve users carrying and presenting physical cards like My Number cards and driver's licenses. Instead of physical cards, the mechanism for presenting a digital ID using the user's own smartphone is called a digital ID wallet, as illustrated in Fig. 3-1. With a digital ID wallet, users can have the legitimacy of their digital ID verified by a trusted entity, and the verification results can be stored on their smartphones. Users of the digital ID wallet can easily present their digital ID to service providers such as hospitals and financial institutions, online or offline, whenever needed.

One important thing to note is that the mechanism of a digital ID wallet is essentially a tool for storing and sharing one's own attribute information, proven for legitimacy by a trusted entity, as a digital ID. Therefore, it is necessary to separate the methods used by the digital ID issuing entity for personal verification and legitimacy verification of attribute information from the mechanism of the digital ID wallet. To use the digital ID stored in the digital ID wallet as a highly reliable proof of identity, it is essential to have stringent issuance control, in addition to highly reliable personal verification by the digital ID issuing entity. Meeting these conditions allows the digital ID stored in the digital ID wallet to be treated as highly reliable identity confirmation information.



Fig. 3-1: Mechanism of a digital ID wallet

3.1.2. Advantages of the Digital ID Wallet

In addition to the ability for users to present their digital ID using their smartphones, whether online or offline, the digital ID wallet offers various advantages. Focusing on users who possess a digital ID wallet, one notable benefit is the ability to reuse a digital ID issued by a trusted entity across a wide range of services. This eliminates the need for complex identity verification processes for each service individually, leading to improved convenience. Another unique advantage of the digital ID wallet is the ability to modify the attribute information to be presented according to the requirements of the entity requesting

the digital ID. For instance, in situations where it is sufficient to prove the user is over 20 years old, there is no need to provide details such as name and address. While such selective disclosure is challenging with traditional paper-based IDs such as driver's licenses, digital ID wallets make it easy.

In the current digital world, the mainstream for centralized management of identity information is the authentication federation model. In this model, every time authentication federation occurs, inquiries are made to the ID provider, who serves as the administrator of identity information. As a result, the ID provider can be aware of the services that an individual is trying to use. In other words, it becomes possible to collect the individual's behavioral history. In the model using a digital ID wallet, once issued, the digital ID is stored in the possession of the digital ID wallet owner. Since there is no inquiry as in the authentication federation model, the issuer will never know that the digital ID has been presented to a third party. The ability to present a digital ID without the issuer knowing the individual's behavioral history provides an advantage in protecting privacy.

There are also advantages for service providers. With a digital ID wallet, service providers can verify the user’s identity just by utilizing the results of highly reliable identity verification conducted by public institutions. This eliminates the need to provide a mechanism for identity verification for each service, thereby improving user convenience while keeping the cost of providing the service low. Additionally, there is an advantage that allows requesting various attribute verifications as needed. For example, in the job recruitment process, companies can request students to present educational credentials, academic transcripts, and proof of qualifications for the purpose of verifying their academic background. In the financial sector, it is possible to request the presentation of account information and borrowing records. While collaboration between the issuer of the digital ID and the service providers is necessary, the flexibility for each industry to determine the specific digital ID to be exchanged is an advantage of the digital ID wallet. Thus, the digital ID wallet has advantages for both users and service providers, and its widespread adoption can be expected in various industries in the future. Especially in sectors dealing extensively with personal information such as finance, healthcare, and public services, the impact is expected to be significant.

3.2. Trends in Various Countries

In recent years, the adoption of digital ID wallets has been rapidly increasing in various parts of the world with specific regional characteristics. This section focuses on three regions: the EU, the United States, and Japan, explaining the approaches to digital ID wallets in each region.

3.2.1. Digital ID Wallets in the EU

The EU is the most proactive region in the world in promoting the adoption of digital ID wallets, led by the European Commission. The European Commission has designated the period from 2021 to 2030 as the "Digital Decade" and set various goals for the digitalization of the EU. One of these goals is “to have over 80% of EU citizens using digital ID by 2030.” Currently, efforts are underway to achieve this target [12].

As part of this initiative, in June 2021, the European Commission released a draft regulation on the EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDIW), obligating member countries to issue EUDIW to all citizens, residents, and businesses within the EU who wish to have it [13]. This ensures that identity verification, which was previously confined within each country, becomes standardized across all EU member countries. Additionally, users can not only modify the scope of personal information shared during identity verification using EUDIW, but also track the personal information they have shared. In February 2023, the EU released a common EU toolbox, including guidelines for architecture and best practices [14]. In June 2023, the EU Council announced that provisional government agreement had been reached on the draft regulation on the EUDIW [15]. It is speculated that the background to the European Commission's promotion of EUDIW includes the unique circumstances of the union of states, where there is a desire for easy

identity verification in EU member states other than one's own.

EUDIW aims to be widely used not only in public services but also in private services. As a specific example, the draft regulation of the European Health Data Space (EHDS) issued by the European Commission in May 2022 mentions that the use of EUDIW for data management and access control of Electronic Health Records (EHR) is being considered [16]. According to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), explicit consent from the individual is required to handle EHR. In other words, for data usage in medical treatment and care (primary use) or data usage for medical research and drug development (secondary use), explicit consent from the individual must be obtained after providing sufficient information about the purpose and scope of data usage to the individual. Additionally, this consent must be easily revocable at any time. If consent is revoked, the processing of previously collected data must be immediately halted. By using the EUDIW mechanism, not only can patient identity verification and consent acquisition be completed online, but patients can also track the usage status of their EHR at any time. Patients can revoke consent at any time, leading to the immediate halt of the processing, such as secondary use of data. This feature eliminates concerns about the unauthorized use of personal information.

In the EU, other use cases are also being considered, and several projects are being conducted experimentally. For instance, there is a project aiming to use EUDIW for online user authentication and granting access to account information to promote electronic payments domestically and across borders [17]. Another project has started to facilitate travel within the EU by managing necessary tickets, passports, individual IDs of companies and countries, and payment digital IDs through EUDIW, allowing users to manage and present them collectively [18].

3.2.2. Digital ID Wallets in the United States

In the United States, the adoption of digital ID wallets is promoted under the leadership of vendors such as Apple and Google, rather than international organizations or government agencies as seen in Europe. While some states already have platforms led by these vendors, others are yet to introduce digital ID wallets, resulting in significant variations in the level of implementation across the country.

Apple's digital ID wallet was initially introduced in March 2022 in the state of Arizona. The digital ID was created in accordance with the ISO18013-5 mDL (mobile Driver’s License) standard, which Apple helped develop. This allows individuals to store state-issued identification cards and driver's licenses as digital IDs within the Apple Wallet [19]. For instance, these digital IDs can be used for identity verification during airport security checks conducted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This has significantly improved the efficiency of passenger security checks.

In June 2023, the Google Wallet service was launched in the state of Maryland [20]. Similar to Apple Wallet, Google Wallet in Maryland allows the storage of state-issued identification cards and driver's licenses.

Currently, this digital ID has been introduced in Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Georgia, and it is expected to expand its coverage in the future.

3.2.3. Digital ID Wallets in Japan

When mentioning the ability to store identification cards on smartphones in Japan, one might imagine the integration of the My Number card into smartphones. Starting from May 11, 2023, a service was launched for Android smartphones that allows the incorporation of electronic certificates for the signature and user verification of My Number cards. Compatibility with iOS smartphones is also planned for the future [21]. However, at present, this service can only provide information such as name, date of birth, address, facial photo, and so on [22].

The most advanced initiative in the field of digital ID wallets in Japan is Trusted Web, promoted by the Trusted Web Promotion Council. When exchanging data on the Internet, there are three challenges: whether the data is trustworthy, whether the other party is trustworthy, and whether the other party can be trusted in handling the data you provide. The Trusted Web is a new digital world

mechanism currently under consideration to realize an ideal state where users themselves (individuals and corporations) manage their digital identity without excessive dependence on specific businesses.

This initiative takes inspiration from the efforts of many countries, including the EU. While the original purpose of the Trusted Web is not the realization of digital ID wallets, the Trusted Web Promotion Council identifies digital ID wallets as a promising technology to achieve the envisioned state of Trusted Web, and is conducting research and various studies. The Council conducted 13 demonstration projects in 2022 and 12 in 2023. For example, at the University of Tokyo, a demonstration project was conducted in 2022 where learners, upon request from other universities or companies, could prove their learning history [23]. In this demonstration project, the university issued proof of learning history, such as academic transcripts, to the learner's own wallet. The learner then used their wallet to disclose the certificate to the company. The reported outcome highlighted the ability to prove learning history to companies at a low cost.

3.3. Standardization of Digital ID Wallet Technology

The standard receiving the most attention from the industry for enabling digital identity wallets is the Verifiable Credentials Data Model developed by W3C [24]. This model defines the fundamental mechanisms and data models for exchanging digital IDs over the web in a cryptographically secure and machine-verifiable manner. As shown in Fig. 3-2, the relationships and roles of stakeholders in the digital ID wallet are represented using the Issuer/Holder/Verifier structure. In this model, a digital ID, known as Verifiable Credentials (VC), is exchanged, containing a compilation of attribute information such as the wallet holder's name, address, and qualifications, as well as information on the issuing entity, to which a digital signature has been added. The stakeholders in this model include the issuer, responsible for issuing VCs; the holder, who owns the issued VCs; and the verifier, who receives the presentation of VCs in the form of Verifiable Presentations (VP) from the holder. For example, in a use case where an individual presents a university graduation certificate to a company, the university serves as the issuer, the individual presenting the graduation certificate is the holder, and the company requesting the presentation of the graduation certificate acts as the verifier. With these elements in place, the model is completed by adding the fourth element, the registry, which registers the public keys used by the parties concerned for signature verification and the schema of VCs issued by the issuer in advance. While there are models that separate the holder and the digital ID wallet they possess, in Fig. 3-2, we represent a model where the digital ID wallet is included in the holder for the sake of simplicity. In explanations about digital IDs, it is common to see models that use Decentralized Identifiers (DID) as identifiers for the issuer and the holder, but in this model, it is also possible to use identifiers other than DID.



Fig. 3-2: Verifiable Credentials Data Model

Organizations such as the OpenID Foundation and the Decentralized Identity Foundation are working towards standardizing digital ID wallets, and developing specific technical specifications, including communication protocols between the issuer, the holder, and the verifier, as well as schemas based on the W3C's

Verifiable Credentials Data Model. As part of these efforts, this article will explore the communication protocol for VC/VP currently under consideration by the OpenID Foundation—known as OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OID4VCI) and OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OID4VP). This protocol utilizes the extended protocol of OpenID Connect to exchange VC/VP. It ensures the validity when exchanging VC/VP by using digital signature technology. First, the holder, who wants to obtain a digital ID, requests the issuance of VC from the issuer. After authenticating the holder in some way, the issuer issues the VC to the holder. Since the VC is signed with the issuer's private key, it does not allow unauthorized generation or tampering. Next, the verifier requests the holder to present the digital ID. At this time, the holder presents the Verifiable Presentation (VP) that is VC signed with the holder's private key to the verifier. The VP includes the signature within the VC granted by the issuer, and in addition, the holder signs the VP itself with the holder's private key. By using the public keys of the issuer and holder to verify these signatures, the verifier can authenticate that the VC contained in the VP is a digital ID issued by the authorized issuer, and further confirm that the VP is a digital ID generated by the holder themselves.

However, in this state, the VP is vulnerable to misuse by a malicious holder. For instance, a malicious holder could impersonate the verifier, receive a legitimate VP sent by the rightful holder, and extract the VC from it. The malicious holder can then use that VC to issue a new VP, and use it as their own digital ID (Fig. 3-3). To prevent this, two processes, Key Proof and Key Binding, are implemented during the issuance of the digital ID (Fig. 3-4). First, the holder, during the request for VC issuance, presents a public key signed with the holder's private key to the issuer, proving that the holder is the legitimate owner of that public key (Key Proof). After that, the issuer includes the holder's public key in the VC data and signs it with the issuer's private key (Key Binding). This process adds information about the holder, the entity for whom the VC is issued, to the VC, preventing the kind of impersonation mentioned above. Additionally, when the holder presents the VP to the verifier, including the verifier's identifier and a one-time-use random number (nonce) in the VP, it prevents the verifier from presenting the VP to other verifiers in a reusable manner.



Fig. 3-3: Example of VC misuse



Fig. 3-4: Prevention of misuse by Key Proof and Key Binding

From a privacy perspective, technical specifications are also being developed to prevent holders from disclosing more information than necessary to verifiers. As an example, let's look at Selective Disclosure for JWT, for which the IETF is considering a specification [25]. This specification defines a format that allows holders to extract only a part of the digital ID contained in the VC and present it to the verifier without invalidating the signature granted by the issuer. The issuer stores hashed values instead of plaintext for multiple attribute items within the VC. When the holder discloses information to the verifier, they present a VP containing the hash values of these multiple attributes and the plaintext of only the attributes they want to disclose. The verifier verifies the plaintext of the attributes and hash values, confirming that it is a digital ID issued by the issuer. This allows the holder to present only the information they want to disclose to the verifier.

3.4. Conclusion

The simple term "digital ID wallet" is beguiling, as there are substantial variations between countries in terms of the goals of implementation, the efforts undertaken to achieve these goals, and the entities leading these initiatives. In addition to the improved convenience of verifying digital IDs online, digital ID wallets have the potential to go beyond this by facilitating data collaboration between different entities. This can contribute to the creation of new services and enhance competitiveness. On the other hand, while digital ID wallets make reliable identity verification easier, there is a potential risk of cyberattacks targeting this capability. For instance, if a mobile device is stolen and its passcode is compromised, the digital ID wallet on the device could be misused. In fact, although not specifically related to digital ID wallets, there have been cases where the authentication of mobile devices became a vulnerability, leading to theft of property [26]. While the widespread adoption of digital ID wallets brings convenience, users also need to exercise caution in handling them.

4. Threat information, "Cyberattack incidents targeting Microsoft Teams users"

Kota Ogasawara, Cyber Security Department

On August 2, 2023, Microsoft Corporation (hereinafter referred to as MS Corporation) released a report regarding phishing attacks targeting users of Microsoft Teams (hereinafter referred to as Teams). According to the company, this series of attacks involved the manipulation of multi-factor authentication (hereinafter referred to as MFA) app on mobile devices, with the aim of bypassing authentication. At the time of the report, approximately 40 global companies were affected. The targeted organizations in this attack included governments, non-governmental organizations, IT service companies, technology companies, manufacturing companies, and media companies [27]. This article introduces the above attack and other Teams-related examples, delving into the background of why this product is targeted.

4.1. Attack Overview and Background

MS Corporation identified a new phishing attack campaign conducted by the Russian cyberattack group known as Midnight Blizzard. The attacker sends messages on Teams, ultimately aiming to steal credentials from users in targeted organizations. The following describes the attack methods and the attacker, and speculates on the reasons Teams is being targeted.

4.1.1. Attack Methods

Using Fig. 4-1, we will explain the attack flow using Teams.



Fig. 4-1: Attack flow chart

The attacker uses Microsoft 365 tenant accounts from small and medium-sized corporations that they had compromised in previous attacks to facilitate the attack. First, the attacker changes the name of the compromised tenant to a security-related name like "Microsoft Identity Protection." Then, they create a new subdomain and set its name to the same string as MS's official domain, "onmicrosoft.com." As a result, the domain name created by the attacker would have a name that includes security-related terms or product names, for example, “teamsprotection.onmicrosoft.com.” Users are more likely to be deceived by seeing this name. Next, the attacker creates a new user associated with the created subdomain. The username is made to be recognizable as technical support or security team (① of Fig. 4-1).

The attacker poses as the technical support of the fake MS domain they created and sends a chat request message on Teams to the target user (② of Fig. 4-1). Once the user grants the request, they receive a message from the attacker prompting them to enter a code specified by the attacker into their Microsoft Authenticator app (③ of Fig. 4-1). When the user enters the code, the user's authentication token is granted to the attacker. The attacker, using this authentication token, impersonates the target user and gains access to Microsoft 365 (④ of Fig. 4-1).
The target users in this attack campaign are those who have set up authentication for their accounts with one-time passwords or other user-owned elements.

4.1.2. Cyberattack Group "Midnight Blizzard"

Midnight Blizzard is also known as APT29, NOBELIUM, and Cozy Bear. The US and UK governments have determined that the cyberattack group belongs to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) [28]. Its main targets include organizations with influence over diplomatic policies in NATO member countries, such as foreign ministries and state departments in Western countries. It also includes organizations in education, energy, telecommunications, and government and military sectors. The group has an interest in undisclosed geopolitical data favorable to the Russian state, and is also active for espionage purposes [29]. Midnight Blizzard is often involved in breaches of user accounts in use, and employs various cyberattack methods such as supply chain attacks, lateral movement from on-premises environments to cloud environments, and breaches of customers of companies providing cloud services like MS Corporation. The US publicly attributed a major cyberattack on SolarWinds products in December 2020 to the same group [30].

4.1.3. Reasons for Targeting Teams

The number of Teams users continues to grow, with over 320 million monthly active users worldwide [31], and more than a million organizations utilizing it as a business chat tool [32]. One of the reasons for the widespread adoption of Teams is the new coronavirus infection. The pandemic of the new coronavirus infection led to an increase in remote work and the use of Teams, accelerating digital transformation. On the other hand, Teams was reported as one of the most targeted applications requiring login among malicious sessions detected in the second half of 2022, according to Proofpoint [33]. Teams has a high level of corporate penetration globally. If the targeted organization uses Teams and vulnerabilities exist within it, attackers have an opportunity to compromise. Teams continues to be a target for attackers.

4.1.4. Other Cases Targeting Teams

There have been numerous reports of attack methods and cases exploiting vulnerabilities in Teams. Some of these are presented below.

(1) Method of exploiting undisclosed API calls

Proofpoint reported on a method exploiting a certain feature of Teams [34]. Attackers can use undisclosed Teams API calls to change the name and order of tabs in a chat. Attackers can modify the URL assigned to a tab or change the link of a website tab to a file. Users may unintentionally open a malicious website or download suspicious files by simply clicking on a tab. Furthermore, it is possible to tamper with the links in meeting invitations or chats. Since meeting invitations and chats are frequently used in daily business operations, users may not consciously check the URLs of the links. Even if the link is tampered with, users may click it without realizing it.

(2) Case of having a malware loader installed

In late August 2023, there was an incident involving infection with the DarkGate loader malware [35]. The attacker sends a message with a URL link to the target

user on Teams from a compromised Office 365 account. At this point if the attacker poses as a user from the HR department and sends notifications to the target user, such as "change in vacation schedule," the target user, wanting to confirm the details, is more likely to open the message and access the URL. When the target user clicks on the URL link, they download a ZIP file from the attacker's website. This ZIP file contains a fake PDF file. The fake PDF file is an LNK file with a file name that includes the extension ".pdf," such as "Changes to the vacation schedule.pdf.lnk." Clicking on the LNK file disguised as a PDF file downloads and executes a malicious VBScript prepared by the attacker from an external site. The VBScript then runs the CURL command to download Autoit3.exe together with a script file in ".AU3" format named "eszexz.au3," to which malicious code has been added by the attacker. Autoit3.exe reads and executes the AU3 script file. Autoit3.exe downloads obfuscated shellcode with the script it read. Afterward, Autoit3 checks to make sure that the antivirus software Sophos is not running, then it de-obfuscates and executes the shellcode. This is the process of DarkGate loader infection.

4.2. Conclusion

The cyberattacks targeting Teams and its users, as presented in this article, can target not only overseas users but also domestic users. In fact, one of our domestic group companies has detected malicious emails from phishing attack campaigns related to Teams. It is speculated that attack campaigns targeting Teams, a popular business chat tool, and similarly popular services will continue and increase in the future. MS Corporation, in response to the Midnight Blizzard attack campaign, emphasizes the need for both user education and system measures. System measures include applying passwordless authentication with anti-phishing features like biometric authentication, strengthening conditional access authentication, and identifying trusted external organizations. It is essential to anticipate incidents like the ones introduced here occurring in the supply chain and proactively consider response measures.

5. Threat information, "Escalation of cybercrime through generative AI chatbots and deepfakes"

Shunsuke Odani, Cyber Security Department

Since January 2023, generative AI including ChatGPT has rapidly emerged and dominated as the leading technology of the year. Various companies have embraced the potential of this generative AI for their businesses. As a specific example, Apple introduced its "Personal Voice" feature in iOS17 and later [36]. This enables the reproduction of voices closely resembling the user's own. Additionally, DeNA developed generative AI technology enabling real-time voice conversion on smartphones [37]. Thus, AI is bringing convenience and efficiency to society. However, on the other hand, the misuse of AI has begun to give rise to new threats.

In this article, we will explain the use of generative AI chatbots and deepfakes (voice-generating AI) by cybercriminals, as well as their impact. This will enhance your understanding of the potential risks of generative AI and how to counter them.

5.1. Generative AI Technologies Specialized in Cybercrime

As an illustration of the societal threats posed by AI, we will explore instances of cybercrime involving generative AI chatbots and deepfakes (voice-generating AI).

5.1.1. Generative AI Chatbots

The misuse of generative AI chatbots can significantly increase the precision and scale of cybercrime. One example is the misuse for cybercrimes such as phishing attacks. Generative AI, with its ability to generate natural text, can create scam emails or phishing emails with sophistication equal to or exceeding that of humans. According to research, distinguishing between text generated by AI and text written by humans has become extremely challenging. Another example is the exploitation of generative AI to improve the efficiency of malware coding. Generative AI enables efficient generation of malware and cracking tools, lowering the barriers for criminals to enter the realm of cybercrime.

To prevent the misuse of generative AI in cybercrime, systems utilizing generative AI have implemented security measures. However, there are two ways in which generative AI can be exploited for these cybercrimes. The first method involves circumventing the security features implemented in generative AI systems like ChatGPT, which are designed to prevent the generation of illegal content. By using a technique called prompt injection, attackers could generate phishing emails or malicious code. The second method involves the use of generative AI with no output restrictions, developed independently by criminals. However, effectively conducting cybercrimes using these techniques requires specialized knowledge of generative AI, and the barrier to entry is definitely not low.

5.1.2. Deepfakes (Voice-generating AI)

Deepfakes (voice-generating AI) can be exploited for a variety of cybercrimes. For example, a deepfake (voice-generating AI) can mimic the voice of a specific individual and generate audio content that the person did not actually say, which can then be posted on the Internet. In fact, political propaganda, fraud, the spread of misinformation, and audio data that defames individuals are proliferating on the

Internet [38] [39] [40] [41].

The misuse of deepfakes (voice-generating AI) may have more severe consequences compared to traditional cyberattacks. First, due to their realism, deepfakes (voice-generating AI) can easily deceive victims into mistaking fake audio for real audio. As a result, many people are easily deceived, and there is a risk of significant damage if deepfakes are exploited in business email compromise (BEC). Detecting such cybercrimes involving deepfakes (voice-generating AI) is challenging, and adequate defense measures are still underdeveloped, presenting a new challenge in cybersecurity.

5.2. Generative AI Chatbots Specialized in Cybercrime

Cybercriminals are independently developing generative AI with no output restrictions and selling its capabilities on the market. As a result, cybercrime has already been exploiting generative AI chatbots without ethical constraints. In this section, we will specifically discuss two generative AI models, "WormGPT" and "FraudGPT," which are highly regarded for their practicality especially as generative AI dedicated to cybercrime.

5.2.1. What Is the Generative AI Chatbot "WormGPT"?

"WormGPT," shown in Fig. 5-1, is the first-ever generative AI tool specifically designed for cybercrime, which was publicly released on the hacker forum "Hack Forums" in June 2023. The usage fee for this generative AI tool was set at 100 EUR (approximately 15,000 yen) per month or 550 EUR (approximately 84,000 yen) per year in a subscription format. Please note that as of January 2024, the WormGPT service has been terminated.



Fig. 5-1: Post of WormGPT sales advertisement on Hack Forums (July 2023) [42]

According to the developer's description in Fig. 5-2, WormGPT is a generative AI model that was trained with an emphasis on malware-related data using various data sources. From this explanation, it is evident that WormGPT can be exploited for code generation for malware and cracking tools.



Fig. 5-2: WormGPT-Data-Source [43]

Fig. 5-3 depicts a case where the research team at the cybersecurity company SlashNext utilized WormGPT to create email bodies for use in business email compromise (BEC). The research team highly evaluated WormGPT's proficiency in fulfilling requests for generating email bodies for cybercrime and noted that the generated emails exhibited excellent persuasiveness. As a result, it was found that WormGPT can be exploited as a tool for cybercrime.



Fig. 5-3: WormGPT-Created-BEC-Attack [43]

5.2.2. What Is the Generative AI Chatbot "FraudGPT"?

FraudGPT is a generative AI tool for cybercrime that started circulating on Telegram channels and several forums from July 22, 2023. The usage fee was set at 200 USD (approximately 28,000 yen) per month or 1,700 USD (approximately 240,000 yen) per year in a subscription format. Similar to WormGPT, this generative AI tool has no ethical restrictions and can be used for activities such as "malicious code creation," "undetectable malware creation," "hacking tool development," and "search for non-VBV bins," as illustrated in Fig. 5-4. Mr. Krishnan has posted screenshots of the usage examples of FraudGPT (Fig. 5-4, Fig. 5-5, Fig. 5-6).



Fig. 5-4: fraud-bot-dark-web [44]



Fig. 5-5: spam-text-example [44]

FromFig. 5-5, FraudGPT appears to have a UI similar to ChatGPT. Additionally, the input-output result in Fig. 5-5 shows the outcome of generating a spam message for SMS, disguised as a message from a major US bank. This suggests the capability to create natural-looking spam messages for SMS that are indistinguishable from genuine messages from a bank.



Fig. 5-6: working-code-example [44]

Furthermore, Fig. 5-6 provides an example of creating a fraudulent page for a major US bank. Thus, FraudGPT makes it easy to generate fraudulent HTML pages, serving as a user-friendly generative AI tool even for those new to cybercrime.

5.3. Cybercrime Cases Using Deepfake (voice-generating AI)

In this section, we will introduce two fraud cases utilizing deepfake technology and propose specific security measures against cybercrime using generative AI based on these cases.

5.3.1. Video Call Scam Using Deepfake

On April 20, 2023, a fraud incident occurred in China in which a spoofed phone call using deepfake technology resulted in the transfer of 4.3 million yuan (approximately 85 million yen) by a victim who mistakenly believed the caller was a friend [40].

In this incident, the fraudster impersonated a friend of the victim's by using deepfake technology to mimic the face and voice of the victim's friend and contacted the victim via a video call on the social networking application “WeChat.” The fraudster explained that they were bidding on a project in another city and wanted 4.3 million yuan transferred from the victim's company bank account to the bid recipient's bank account. They explained to the victim that the required amount would be sent immediately. As proof of the remittance, the fraudster sent a screenshot of a fake bank transfer slip showing the funds purportedly transferred to the victim's company bank account. Believing this, the victim transferred 4.3 million yuan to the specified bank account in two separate transactions. In fact, the bank account provided for the bid was actually the fraudster's bank account.

After the transfer was completed, the victim contacted the friend to confirm, and talked about the video call and the request for money transfer, but the friend denied having engaged in any such actions. As a result, the victim became aware that they had fallen victim to fraud. Following a police intervention prompted by the report, they were able to recover 3,368,400 yuan (approximately 67 million yen). However, the whereabouts of the remaining 931,600 yuan (approximately 18 million yen) are unknown (under investigation).

5.3.2. Deepfake Incoming Calls That Mimic the Voice of the Managing Director

On August 22, the Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan (IPA), released the "Initiative for Cyber Security Information sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSIP) Operational Status [April-June 2023]," featuring cases of cybercrime involving the misuse of deepfake technology [41].

As shown in Fig. 5-7, the attacker initially sent an email impersonating the chairman of Company A to the president of Company B. On the same day, the attacker used generative AI (deepfake technology) to make a phone call imitating the voice of the managing director of Company A, stating that they were following up on the communication initiated by the chairman of Company A through email. During this call, the originating phone number was disguised as Company A's main number. While the specific details of the conversation (including language) are unknown, for some reason, the president of Company B realized that the caller was not the managing director of Company A. Upon informing the attacker, who was posing as Company A's managing director, of this realization, the call was abruptly ended. Thanks to the president of Company B identifying the attacker's impersonation, no financial losses occurred.



Fig. 5-7Interaction with the attacker (May 2023) [41]

5.3.3. Countermeasures

From the cases in 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, it is evident that deepfake technology is facilitating fraudulent crimes. Especially in situations involving urgent real estate transactions, bidding processes, and even ransom demands in kidnapping cases, where making accurate judgments is challenging, detecting sophisticated deepfakes becomes even more difficult. To protect oneself from the threat of deepfakes, both individual and organizational measures are essential.

(1) Individual measures

For communication methods, such as phone calls where it is challenging to trust the other party based on voice alone due to its mimic-ability using generative AI (deepfake technology), measures can be taken by using reliable alternative methods to contact the person or confirming their identity or the content through multiple alternative means. Start by using communication methods that can verify that the person you are communicating with is the person you think you are talking to. If using email, use a trustworthy email environment that supports SPF, DKIM, and DMARK. Additionally, combining multiple different communication methods like chat, social media, SMS, etc., can increase the reliability of identity verification.

(2) Organizational measures

To avoid falling victim to deepfakes, it is essential for employees to be informed about the cybercrime techniques exploiting deepfake technology, understand that anyone can be deceived, and remain vigilant. One approach to protecting employees from cybercrimes exploiting deepfake is through a security education program tailored for them, where employees will learn about the techniques, examples, and countermeasures associated with cybercrimes exploiting deepfake technology. Providing security education to explain the latest cyberattacks and cybercrimes will also help employees voluntarily collect information on the latest security trends and cyberattacks so that they can recognize security risks and take security countermeasures and avoidance actions.

However, as the accuracy of deepfakes improves, it becomes more challenging to detect false information created by attackers or criminals. Therefore, as a technical measure, we look forward to the development and widespread adoption of deepfake detection tools. For instance, technologies have been developed for AI detection of voices generated with deepfake, for prevention of misuse by limiting voice synthesis using specific individuals' voices [11], and for creating a model of the "vocal tract," the pathway of the voice, from the person's voice and using that vocal tract model to identify whether the voice is human or synthetic [12]. According to market research firm HSRC, the global market for deepfake detection technology was still in its developmental stages, with a size of 3.86 billion USD as of 2020 [10]. It is expected that the market will expand in the future and that technological development will continue to progress rapidly.

(3) Legal measures

The "EU Artificial Intelligence Act" [14], which is a comprehensive AI regulation proposal encompassing deepfakes and generative AI in Europe, aims to protect humans from AI and pursue technological innovation while using AI safely. The "Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis of Internet-based Information Services" [13], enacted by China, regulates media synthesis using generative AI and deepfake technology, aiming to prevent the creation and spread of illegal information. From these initiatives, we expect to see the development of laws regulating the misuse of AI worldwide.

5.4. Conclusion

This article introduced cases of generative AI chatbots and deepfakes that cybercriminals exploit. The emergence of generative AI chatbots, such as WormGPT and FraudGPT, has enabled even novice cyber attackers to create malware or phishing emails with little effort in a short time. As a result, the barrier to entry for engaging in cybercrime has been lowered.

Moreover, the increasing sophistication in the automatic generation of phishing email text is a significant concern. Traditional phishing emails could be detected

through grammatical errors or typos. However, with the evolution of generative AI, these typos and awkward grammar have been eliminated, allowing for the creation of more refined text. Consequently, identifying phishing emails based on awkwardness in text has become challenging. Therefore, relying on human visual inspection alone is not sufficient; it is crucial to implement technical measures with the latest security software and filtering tools to thoroughly detect and block phishing emails.

In the future, it is quite realistic to see the emergence of cyberattack methods combining generative AI chatbots and Emotet, where the attacker learns the email habits of the target using all the emails in the sent mail folder to create email content and then sends phishing emails or BEC emails to relevant parties. Furthermore, after the attacker hijacks Teams, it is possible for the attacker's generative AI to learn the person's chat and then talk the chat partner into executing malware. In this way, as generative AI can learn faster than attackers can grasp the habits of their targets, chat attacks using generative AI are likely to be cost-effective.

The evolution of deepfake technology is expanding its scope of applications. Particularly with a significant reduction in learning costs, it is possible to create sophisticated impersonations using publicly available images and videos on social media This broadens the misuse of deepfakes from prank-level acts to socially impactful activities such as creating fake videos infringing on others' portrait rights or copyrights and spreading fake videos for election interference and political turmoil. Moreover, the generation of videos and images using deepfake technology raises concerns about the serious issue of fabricating crime evidence to create an alibi. With the evolution of deepfake technology, previously impossible acts like tampering with or fabricating evidence are becoming possible. To prevent such evidence fabrication, it is hoped that laws regulating the use of AI will strengthen restrictions on the criminal use of AI.

6. Outlook

Increased Supply Chain Attacks

The large-scale incident in May 2023 involving MOVEit Transfer (secure file transfer/sharing service) provided by Progress Software was a supply chain attack caused by unauthorized access stemming from vulnerabilities. The incident that occurred in September 2023 at Okta, an ID management platform provider, following a similar incident in 2022, was also a supply chain attack.

If attackers cannot directly infiltrate the target organization, they may compromise the manufacturer of the products or the cloud services used by the target organization, attempting to infiltrate the target organization through another entity. Additionally, the purpose of a supply chain attack, aside from the above reason, may be an attempt to simultaneously infiltrate numerous organizations through a single service, as in the case of the supply chain attack via Solarwinds Corporation. The latter type of supply chain attack is an efficient cyberattack method that allows infiltrating multiple organizations at once. The incidents involving MOVEit Transfer and Okta were examples of the latter type of supply chain attack.

Open-source software and third-party products or services widely used by many organizations serve as gateways for attackers to compromise numerous target organizations at once. It is anticipated that supply chain attacks targeting products and services used by many organizations will continue to increase in the future.

Furthermore, attackers are likely to conduct supply chain attacks targeting emerging technologies and services. For example, we suspect that they will target companies developing software or services utilizing AI, which many organizations are focusing on, companies developing products related to the increasingly adopted Zero Trust Security products, and cloud services.

Enhanced Requirements for Sending Emails to Gmail and Widespread Adoption of DMARC

Google announced new requirements for senders who send a large volume of emails, exceeding 5,000 emails per day to Gmail addresses, in October 2023. Here are the three specific requirements:

1. Authenticating outgoing emails
2. Not sending unauthorized or spam emails
3. Enabling recipients to easily unsubscribe from email distribution

These requirements will apply to the above email senders starting from February 2024. Emails that do not meet these requirements may be blocked or classified as spam from February onwards. Detailed explanations can be found in the Gmail Help section under "Get the detailed requirements for sending 5,000 or more emails per day [45]."

The first requirement, "authenticating outgoing emails," includes requirements related to DMARC, which has not been widely adopted in Japan. For this reason, there is a lot of talk in the email security community that "DMARC will finally become more widely used in Japan thanks to Gmail's enhanced requirements." The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications annually releases the adoption rate of email transmission authentication in the Information and Communications White Paper. According to the FY2023 White Paper, the adoption rate of DMARC was 2.7% as of December 2022 [46]. It was 2.1% in 2021 and has continued to experience a slight increase in recent years. On the other hand, the number of phishing reports published by the Council of Anti-Phishing Japan has generally been on the rise, reaching a record high of 156,000 reports in October 2023 [47].

Phishing attackers search for domains with no DMARC settings or loose checks in their DNS, sending phishing emails disguised as such domains. Therefore, as

DMARC becomes more widespread, the number of domains that can be used for spoofing will decrease, leading to a reduction in phishing email instances. Additionally, with DMARC implementation and proper policy configuration, spoofed phishing emails can be blocked or isolated by the receiving mail server before reaching the target mailbox. Given the obvious benefits of DMARC in protecting your brands from phishing, it is strongly recommended to take the opportunity presented by Gmail's enhanced requirements to review the authentication settings for your own domain's outgoing emails.

7. Timeline

Yuhei Terashi, Ryotaro Tanaka, Cyber Security Department, NTTDATA-CERT



* Some of the dates in the timeline are not the dates of the occurrence but of the report.

△□◇○: Domestic
▲■◆●: International/Overseas

△▲: Vulnerability
□■: Incident/Accident
◇◆: Threat
○●: Countermeasure



* Some of the dates in the timeline are not the dates of the occurrence but of the report.

△□◇○: Domestic
▲■◆●: International/Overseas

△▲: Vulnerability
□■: Incident/Accident
◇◆: Threat
○●: Countermeasure



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

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

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

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